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Abstract: We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game
over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a
current action profile such that at new action profile all players from the coalition are strictly
benefited. Such deviations define a coalitional better-response (CBR) dynamics that is in general
stochastic. The CBR dynamics either converges to a strong Nash equilibrium or stucks in a closed
cycle. We also assume that at each time a selected coalition makes mistake in deviation with small
probability that add mutations (perturbations) into CBR dynamics. We prove that all strong
Nash equilibria and closed cycles are stochastically stable, i.e., they are selected by perturbed
CBR dynamics as mutations vanish. Similar statement holds for strict strong Nash equilibrium.
We apply CBR dynamics to the network formation games and we prove that all strongly stable
networks and closed cycles are stochastically stable.
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La dynamique de meilleure réponse de coalitions et l’équilibre de
Nash fort
Résumé : Nous considérons un processus de formation de coalitions entre les joueurs d’un jeu
fini stratégique sur l’horizon de temps infini. Á chaque étape, une coalition formée au hasard fait une
déviation conjointe de l’ensemble actuel des actions de telle sorte qu’au nouveau ensemble des actions,
tous les joueurs de la coalition sont strictement bénéficié. Telles déviations définissent une dynamique
de meilleure réponse de coalitions, Coalitional Better-Response dynamics en anglais (CBR), qui est en
général stochastique. La dynamique CBR soit converge vers un équilibre de Nash fort ou á un cycle
fermé. En outre, nous supposons que á chaque étape une coalition sélectionnée fait une faute avec faible
probabilité qui ajoutent des mutations (perturbations) dans la dynamique CBR. Nous prouvons que tous
les équilibres de Nash forts et les cycles fermés sont stochastiquement stable, ce est á dire, ils sont choisis
par CBR perturbée quand les mutations disparaissent. Une affirmation similaire a lieu pour l’équilibre
de Nash fort et stricte. Nous appliquons la dynamique CBR aux jeux de formation de réseau et nous
prouvons que tous les réseaux fortement stables et des cycles fermés sont stochastiquement stable.
Mots-clés : Forte équilibre de Nash, Coalitionnelle meilleure réponse, Stabilité stochastique, Jeux de
formation de réseau, Réseaux fortement stable.
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1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the most desirable solution concept in non-cooperative game theory. When a strategic
game is played repeatedly over infinite horizon then the Nash equilibrium that is played in the long run
depends on an initial action profile as well as the way all the players choose their actions at each time.
Several discrete time dynamics have been studied in the literature to study the Nash equilibrium selection
in the long run. Young [15] considered an n players strategic game where at each time all the players
make a simultaneous move and each player chooses an action that is the best response to k previous
games among the m, k ≤ m, most recent games in past. In general this dynamics need not converge
to a Nash equilibrium, it may stuck into a closed cycle. Young [15] also considered the case where at
each time with small probability each player makes mistake and chooses some non-optimal action. These
mistakes add mutations into the dynamics. In general the mutations can be sufficiently small which leads
to the definition of stability of Nash equilibrium as mutations vanish. This type of stability is known as
stochastic stability. Young proposed an algorithm to compute the stochastically stable Nash equilibria.
For 2× 2 coordination games he showed that the risk dominant Nash equilibrium is stochastically stable.
Kandori et al. [13] considered a different dynamic model where at each time each player plays with
every other player in pairwise contest. The pairwise contest is given by 2 × 2 symmetric matrix game
and each player chooses an action which has higher expected average payoff. The mutations are present
into dynamics due to wrong actions taken by the players. For 2 × 2 coordination games they showed
that a risk dominant Nash equilibrium is stochastically stable. That is, for 2× 2 coordination games the
dynamics given by Young [15] and Kandori et al. [13] selects the same Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg
et al. [7] proposed a dynamics where at each time only one player is selected to choose actions. The
mutations with small probability also occur at each time. The risk dominant Nash equilibrium in 2 × 2
coordination games need not be stochastically stable under this dynamics.
The Nash equilibrium concept is inadequate for the situations where players can a priori communicate,
being in a position to form a coalition and jointly deviate in a coordinated way. To capture such situations
the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) introduced by Aumann [1] is an adequate solution concept. From
an SNE there is no coalition that can deviate to a new action profile such that at new action profile
the actions of all players from outside of the coalition are same as at SNE and all the players from the
coalition are strictly benefited. There is another equilibrium notion that is stronger than the SNE. Such
equilibrium is called as strict strong Nash equilibrium (SSNE). From an SSNE there is no coalition that
can deviate to a new action profile such that at new action profile the actions of all players from outside
of the coalition are same as at SSNE and all the players from coalition get at least as much as at SSNE
and at least one player is strictly benefited. It is clear that an SSNE is always an SNE. As motivated
from the application of SNE in network formation games by Dutta and Mutuswami [6] and SSNE in
network formation games by Jackson and van den Nouweland [11], Jackson [10] we restrict ourselves to
only pure actions. A network that is stable against the deviations of all coalitions is called as strongly
stable network and under top convexity condition on payoff functions it indeed exists as shown by Jackson
and van den Nouweland [11]. An SNE need not always exist and in such case there exists some set of
action profiles forming a closed cycle such that it is possible to reach from one action profile to another
via sequence of improving deviations from the coalitions; and it is not possible to reach an action profile
outside of the closed cycle from an action profile belonging to closed cycle via improving deviations from
the coalitions.
There are many dynamics for equilibrium selection in the literature, as discussed before, describing
various situations of the dynamic play. To the best of our knowledge so far no dynamics has been proposed
that captures the situation where at each time players are allowed to form a coalition and make a move
in a coordinated way. In this paper we propose a CBR dynamics where at each time players are allowed
to form a coalition and make a joint deviation from the current action profile if it is strictly beneficial
for all the members of the coalition. We assume that the coalition formation is random and at each
time only one coalition can be formed. We also consider the situation where at each time the formed
coalition makes wrong decision with small probability, i.e., they make a move to an action profile where
all the players from the coalition are not strictly benefited. These mistakes work as mutations and add
perturbations into CBR dynamics. We prove that the perturbed CBR dynamics selects all strong Nash
equilibria and closed cycles in the long run as mutations vanish, i.e., all strong Nash equilibria and closed
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cycles are stochastically stable. For 2× 2 symmetric coordination games this dynamics always selects a
payoff dominant Nash equilibrium instead of risk dominant Nash equilibrium because a payoff dominant
Nash equilibrium is an SNE. The similar CBR dynamics can be given for the case where each time a
coalition deviate from a current action profile such that all players from the coalition are at least as well
off at new action profile and at least one player is strictly better off. Under such dynamics all strict
strong Nash equilibria and closed cycles are stochastically stable.
We apply CBR dynamics corresponding to SSNE to network formation games where nodes (players)
of a network form a coalition and make a move to a new network if it offers each player at least as much
as it is in the current network and at least one player gets strictly better payoff. The mutations are
present due to the wrong decisions taken by the coalitions. We prove that all strongly stable networks
and closed cycles are stochastically stable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model and few definitions. We describe the
CBR dynamics in Section 3. Section 4 contains the application of CBR dynamics to network formation
games. We conclude our paper in Section 5. As a by-product, we give an algorithm to compute an SNE
in Appendix A.
2 The Model
We consider an n-player strategic game whose components are defined as follows:
1. N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is a finite set of players.
2. Ai is a finite set of actions of player i and its element is denoted by ai. We denote A =
∏n
i=1Ai as
a set of all action profiles and a = (a1, a2, · · · , an) denotes an element of A. Let S be the set of all
coalitions among players. For a coalition S ∈ S, define AS =
∏
i∈S Ai whose element is denoted by
aS and a−S denotes an action profile of players outside S.
3. ui : A → R is a payoff function of player i. Specifically, player i receives payoff ui(a1, a2, · · · , an)
when each player i, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, chooses action ai.
In non-cooperative games, the Nash equilibrium is stable against unilateral deviations, i.e., no player
has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from it. But, the Nash equilibrium fails to capture the situation
where a priori the players can communicate with each other. In such cases some of the players can form
a coalition and jointly deviate from a current action profile if at new action profile each player from the
coalition is strictly benefited. In some cases players also make a joint deviation from a current action
profile if at new action profile all the players of coalition are at least as well off and at least one player is
strictly better off. Such deviations lead to the definitions of strong Nash equilibrium [1] and strict strong
Nash equilibrium which we define next. As motivated from the application of SNE in network formation
games by Dutta and Mutuswami [6] and application of SSNE in network formation games by Jackson
and van den Nouweland [11], Jackson [10] we restrict ourselves to pure actions.
Definition 2.1 (Strong Nash Equilibrium). An action profile a∗ is said to be a strong Nash equilibrium
if there is no S ∈ S and a ∈ A such that
1. ai = a
∗
i , ∀ i /∈ S.
2. ui(a) > ui(a
∗), ∀ i ∈ S.
Let A(S, a) be the set of all action profiles reachable from a via deviation of coalition S. It is defined
as,
A(S, a) = {a′|a′i = ai, ∀ i /∈ S and a
′
i ∈ Ai, ∀ i ∈ S}.
A coalition always has option to do nothing, so a ∈ A(S, a). Let I1(S, a) be the set of improved action
profiles reachable from an action profile a via deviation of coalition S, i.e.,
I1(S, a) = {a
′|a′i = ai, ∀ i /∈ S and ui(a
′) > ui(a), ∀ i ∈ S}. (1)
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For an improved action profile a′ ∈ I1(S, a), an action profile a′S of all players from S is called as
a better-response of coalition S against a fixed action profile a−S of the players outside S. Define,
I1(S, a) = A(S, a) \ I1(S, a) as a set of all action profiles due to the erroneous decisions of coalition S. It
is clear that a /∈ I1(S, a), so a ∈ I1(S, a). That is, I1(S, a) is always nonempty for all S and a. An SNE
need not always exist. In such a case there exists some set of action profiles lying on a closed cycle and
all such action profiles can be reached from each other via an improving path. The definitions of closed
cycle and improving path are as follows:
Definition 2.2 (Improving Path). An improving path from a to a′ is a sequence of action profiles
and coalitions a1, S1, a
2, · · · , am−1, Sm−1, a
m such that a1 = a, am = a′ and ak+1 ∈ I1(Sk, a
k) for all
k = 1, 2, · · · ,m− 1.
Definition 2.3 (Cycles). A set of action profiles C form a cycle if for any a ∈ C and a′ ∈ C there exists
an improving path connecting a and a′. A cycle is said to be a closed cycle if no action profile in C lies
on an improving path leading to an action profile that is not in C.
Theorem 2.4. There always exists a strong Nash equilibrium or a closed cycle of action profiles.
Proof. An action profile is an SNE if and only if it is not possible for any coalition to make an improving
deviation from it to another action profile. So, start at an action profile. Either it is SNE or there exists
a coalition that can make an improving deviation to another action profile. In the first case result is
established. For the second case the same thing holds, i.e., either this new action profile is an SNE or
there exists a coalition that can make an improving deviation to another action profile. Given the finite
number of action profiles, the above process either finds an action profile which is an SNE or it reaches
to the starting action profile, i.e., there exists a cycle. Thus, we have proved that there always exists
either an SNE or a cycle. Suppose there are no strong Nash equilibria. Given the finite number of action
profile and non-existence of strong Nash equilibria there must exists a maximal set C of action profiles
such that for any a ∈ C and a′ ∈ C there exists an improving path connecting a and a′ and no action
profile in C lies on an improving path leading to an action profile that is not in C. Such a set C is a
closed cycle.
An SSNE can be defined similarly. An action profile a∗ in Definition 2.1 is said to be SSNE if the
condition 1 is same and the condition 2 is ui(a) ≥ ui(a∗) for all i ∈ S with at least one strict inequality.
That is, a∗ is an SSNE if it is not possible for any coalition S ∈ S to deviate from a∗ to some a ∈ A such
that the actions of all players outside S are same in both a and a∗ and at a all players from S are at
least as well off as at a∗ and the payoff of at least one player at a is better than at a∗. In this case, for
the given action profile a and coalition S the set of improved action profiles I2(S, a) is defined as,
I2(S, a) = {a
′|a′i = ai, ∀ i ∈ S, and ui(a
′) ≥ ui(a), ∀ i ∈ S, uj(a
′) > uj(a), for some j ∈ S}. (2)
and I2(S, a) = A(S, a)\I2(S, a). The definitions of improving path and cycles can be defined analogously
to previous case. A result similar to Theorem 2.4 holds, i.e., there always exists at least an SSNE or a
closed cycle of action profiles. An SSNE is always an SNE, i.e., the set of strict strong Nash equilibria
is a subset of the set of strong Nash equilibria. An SNE is a weakly Pareto optimal and an SSNE is a
Pareto optimal. Now, we give few examples illustrating the presence of SNE, SSNE and closed cycle.
Example 2.5. Consider a two player game
b1 b2
a1
a2
(
(−2,−2) (−10,−1)
(−1,−10) (−5,−5)
)
.
The above game represents a famous example of prisoner’s dilemma. Here (a2, b2) is the only Nash
equilibrium that is not an SNE because both player can jointly deviate to (a1, b1) where both of them
are strictly better off. So, in this game there is no SNE and SSNE. The closed cycle of action profile is
given in Figure 1
A directed edge (a2, b2)
{1,2}
−−−→ (a1, b1) of Figure 1 represents a deviation by coalition {1, 2}. The other
directed edges of the closed cycle are similarly defined.
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(a1, b1)
(a2, b1)
(a2, b2)
(a1, b2)
{2}{1}
{2}
{1,2}
{1}
Figure 1: Closed Cycle
Example 2.6. Consider a two player game
b1 b2 b3
a1
a2
a3


(4, 4) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (4, 5) (1, 6)
(0, 0) (2, 5) (6, 1)

 .
This example has both SNE and closed cycle. The action profile (a1, b1) is an SNE and the closed cycle
is defined as below:
(a2, b2)
(a2, b3)
(a3, b3)
(a3, b2)
{2}
{1}{2}
{1}
Figure 2: Closed Cycle
But, (a1, b1) is not an SSNE because according to the improved action profile set defined by (2), both
player can make a joint deviation from action profile (a1, b1) to (a2, b2). But, if we change the payoff
vector corresponding to (a2, b2) from (4, 5) to (4− α, 5) for α > 0 then (a1, b1) is also an SSNE.
3 Dynamic play
We consider the situation where n players play the strategic game defined in Section 2. We assume that
the players can a priori communicate with each other and hence they can form a coalition and jointly
Inria
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deviate from the current action profile to a new action profile if new action profile is strictly beneficial for
all members of coalition. We consider the coalition formation over infinite horizon. That is, at each time
a coalition is randomly formed and it makes a deviation from current action profile to a new action profile
such that at new action profile the actions of the players outside the coalition remain same as before and
each player of the coalition is strictly benefited. If there is no such improved action profile for a coalition
then it does not deviate. The same thing repeats at next stage and it continues for infinite horizon. Such
deviations define a coalitional better-response (CBR) dynamics. We assume that the coalition formation
is random and at each time only one coalition can be formed. If there are more than one improved action
profiles for a coalition then each improved action profile can be chosen with positive probability. That is,
the CBR dynamics is stochastic. The CBR dynamics defines a Markov chain over a finite set of action
profiles A. We also assume that at each time selected coalition makes mistake and make a joint deviation
to an action profile where all members of the coalition are not strictly benefited. This happens with very
small probability. Such mistakes add mutations into CBR dynamics. The mutations add another level
of stochasticity in the CBR dynamics and as a result we have perturbed Markov chain, see e.g., [2, 3].
We are interested in the action profile which is going to be selected by the CBR dynamics as mutations
vanish. We next describe the stochastic CBR dynamics as discussed above.
3.1 A stochastic CBR dynamics without mistakes
At each time t = 0, 1, 2, · · · a coalition St is selected randomly with probability pSt > 0. We assume
that at each time selected coalition makes an improving deviation from current action profile at, i.e., at
time t+ 1, the new action profile is at+1 ∈ I1(St, at) with probability pI1(a
t+1|St, a
t) where pI1(·|St, a
t)
is a probability measure over finite set I1(St, at). When there are no improving deviations for coalition
St then at+1 = at. Let X0t denotes the action profile at time t, then {X
0
t }
∞
t=0 is a finite Markov chain on
set A. The transition law P 0 of the Markov chain is defined as follows:
P 0(X0t+1 = a
′|X0t = a) =
∑
S∈S;I1(S,a) 6=φ
pS pI1(a
′|S, a)1I1(S,a)(a
′) +
∑
S∈S;I1(S,a)=φ
pS1{a′=a}(a
′), (3)
where 1B is an indicator function for a given set B. It is clear that the strong Nash equilibria and closed
cycles are the recurrent classes of P 0. An SNE corresponds to an absorbing state of P 0 and a closed
cycle corresponds to a recurrent class of P 0 having more than one action profiles.
From Example 2.6 it is clear that in general the closed cycles together with strong Nash equilibria
can be present in a game. In that case the CBR dynamics need not converge. In Example 2.6 the CBR
dynamics need not converge to SNE (a1, b1) because once CBR dynamics enter into closed cycle given in
Figure 2 then it will never come out of it. The closed cycle C = {(a2, b2), (a2, b3), (a3, b3), (a3, b2)} is a
recurrent class and (a1, b1) is an absorbing state of Markov chain P 0 corresponding to the game given in
Example 2.6.
We call a game acyclic if it has no closed cycles. The acyclic games include coordination games. There
exists at least one SNE for acyclic games from Theorem 2.4. For acyclic games the Markov chain defined
by (3) is absorbing. Hence from the theory of Markov chain the CBR dynamics given in Section 3.1 will
be at SNE in the long run no matter from where it starts [14].
3.2 A stochastic CBR dynamics with mistakes
Now, we assume that at each time t the selected coalition St makes error in making a deviation from
at and as a result it moves to an action profile where some player(s) in the coalition St are not strictly
better off. We assume that at action profile at, coalition St makes error with f(St, at)ε probability, where
f : S × A → (0,∞) and 0 < ε < 1
M
with M = maxS∈S,a∈A f(S, a). The factor f(St, at) shows the
dependence of coalition St and current action profile at. The factor ε determines the probability with
which players in general make mistakes. These mistakes add mutations to CBR dynamics and as a result
we have perturbed Markov chain {Xεt }
∞
t=0 . So, at time t+1 with probability (1−f(St, a
t)ε)pI1(a
t+1|St, a
t)
the perturbed Markov chain switches to at+1 ∈ I1(St, at) and with probability f(St, at)εpI1(a
t+1|St, a
t)
it switches to at+1 ∈ I1(St, at) ; pI1(·|St, a
t) is a probability measure over finite set I1(St, at). In the
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situation where there are no improved action profiles for coalition St, then at+1 = at with probability
1−f(St, a
t)ε and at+1 ∈ I1(St, at)\{at} with probability f(St, at)εpI1\{at}(a
t+1|St, a
t); pI1\{at}(·|St, a
t)
is a probability measure over finite set I1(St, at)\{at}. The transition law P ε of perturbed Markov chain
is defined as below:
P ε(Xεt+1 = a
′|Xεt+1 = a) =
∑
S∈S;I1(S,a) 6=φ
pS
(
(1 − f(S, a)ε)pI1(a
′|S, a)1I1(S,a)(a
′)
+ f(S, a)εpI1(a
′|S, a)1I1(S,a)(a
′)
)
+
∑
S∈S;I1(S,a)=φ
pS
(
(1 − f(S, a)ε)1{a′=a}(a
′)
+ f(S, a)εpI1\{a}(a
′|S, a)1I1(S,a)\{a}(a
′)
)
, (4)
for all a, a′ ∈ A.
Given all possible coalitional moves and nonzero mutations, it is possible to reach one action profile
from another with positive probability in one step. This implies that the perturbed Markov chain {Xεt }
∞
t=0
is aperiodic and irreducible. Hence, there exists a unique stationary distribution µε for perturbed Markov
chain. However, when ε = 0, there can be several stationary distributions corresponding to different
SNEs or closed cycles. Such Markov chains are called singularly perturbed Markov chains [2, 3]. We are
interested in the action profiles to which stationary distribution µε assigns positive probability as ε→ 0.
This leads to the definition of a stochastically stable action profile.
Definition 3.1. An action profile a is stochastically stable relative to process P ε if limε→0 µ
ε
a > 0.
We recall few definitions from [15]. From (4), we have P ε(a′|a) > 0 for all a, a′ ∈ A. The one step
resistance from an action profile a to an action profile a′ 6= a is defined as the minimum number of
mistakes (mutations) that are required for the transition from a to a′ 6= a and it is denoted by r(a, a′).
From (4) it is clear that the transition from a to a′ has the probability of order ε if a′ /∈ I1(S, a) for all S
and thus has resistance 1 and is of order 1 otherwise, so has resistance 0. So, in our setting r(a, a′) ∈ {0, 1}
for all a, a′ ∈ A. A zero resistance between two action profiles corresponds to a transition with positive
probability under P 0. One can view the action profiles as the nodes of a directed graph that has no self
loops and the weight of a directed edge between two different nodes is represented by one step resistance
between them. Since P ε is an irreducible Markov chain then there must exist at least one directed path
between any two recurrent classes Hi and Hj of P 0 which starts from Hi and ends at Hj . The resistance
of any path is defined as the sum of the weights of the corresponding edges. The resistance of a path
which is minimum among all paths from Hi to Hj is called as resistance from Hi to Hj and it is denoted
by rij . The resistance from any action profile ai ∈ Hi to any action profile aj ∈ Hj is rij because inside
Hi and Hj action profiles are connected with a path of zero resistance. Here rij = 1 because given all
possible coalitional deviations it is always possible to reach from an action profile that belongs to Hi to
an action profile belonging to Hj in exactly 1 mutation.
Now we recall the definition of stochastic potential of a recurrent class Hi of P 0 from [15]. It can be
computed by restricting to a reduced graph. Construct a graph G where total number of nodes are the
number of recurrent classes of P 0(one action profile from each recurrent class) and a directed edge from
ai to aj is weighted by rij . That is, the resistance of a directed edge from ai to aj is 1. Take a node
ai ∈ G and consider all the spanning trees such that from every node aj ∈ G, aj 6= ai, there is a unique
path directed from aj to ai. Such spanning trees are called as ai-trees. The resistance of an ai-tree is the
sum of the resistances of its edges. The stochastic potential of ai is the resistance of an ai-tree having
minimum resistance among all ai-trees. The stochastic potential of each node in Hi is same [15], which
is a stochastic potential of Hi. Suppose there are J number of recurrent classes of P 0, then, an ai-tree
will have J − 1 number of edges and the resistance of each edge is 1. So, the resistance of each ai-tree is
J − 1. This implies that the stochastic potential of recurrent class Hi is J − 1 and this is true for all the
recurrent classes. So, in our case the stochastic potential of all the recurrent classes of P 0 is same.
Theorem 3.2. All strong Nash equilibria and closed cycles of an n-player finite strategic game are
stochastically stable.
Inria
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Proof. We know that the Markov chain P ε is aperiodic and irreducible. From (3) and (4) it is easy to
see that
lim
ε→0
P ε(a′|a) = P 0(a′|a), ∀ a, a′ ∈ A.
From (4) it is clear that, if P ε(a′|a) > 0 for some ε ∈ (0, ε0], then we have
0 < ε−r(a,a
′)P ε(a′|a) <∞.
Markov chain P ε satisfies all three required conditions of Theorem 4 in [15] from which it follows that
as ε→ 0, µε converges to some stationary distribution µ0 of P 0 and an action profile a is stochastically
stable, i.e., µ0a > 0 if and only if a is contained in a recurrent class of P
0 having minimum stochastic
potential. We know that the recurrent classes of Markov chain P 0 are strong Nash equilibria or closed
cycles and the stochastic potential of all the recurrent classes are same. Thus, all the strong Nash
equilibria and closed cycles are stochastically stable.
Remark 3.3. Since the perturbed process P ε satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4 in [15] for all functions
f(·), the stochastic stability of strong Nash equilibria and closed cycles is independent of f(·).
We can have a similar CBR dynamics without mistakes and with mistakes as given in Sections 3.1
and 3.2 respectively, if for all S ∈ S and a ∈ A the set of improved action profiles is I2(S, a) as defined
by (2). We have the following result.
Theorem 3.4. All strict strong Nash equilibria and closed cycles of an n-player finite strategic game are
stochastically stable under corresponding CBR dynamics.
Proof. The proof follows from the similar arguments given in Theorem 3.2.
3.2.1 Equilibrium selection in coordination games
First we consider a 2 × 2 coordination game and discuss which Nash equilibrium is selected by CBR
dynamics in the long run when probability of making mistakes vanish. We compare our equilibrium se-
lection results in 2×2 coordination games with existing results from [13],[15]. Later we discuss equilibrium
selection results in general m×m symmetric coordination games.
Consider a 2× 2 coordination game,
s1 s2
s1
s2

(a11, b11) (a12, b12)
(a21, b21) (a22, b22)

,
where ajk, bjk ∈ R, j, k ∈ {1, 2} and a11 > a21, b11 > b12, a22 > a12, b22 > b21. Ai = {s1, s2}, i = 1, 2.
Here (s1, s1) and (s2, s2) are two strict Nash equilibria. In this game there are two types of Nash equilibria
one is payoff dominant and other one is risk dominant. If a11 > a22, b11 > b22, then (s1, s1) is payoff
dominant and if a11 < a22, b11 < b22, then (s2, s2) is payoff dominant. In other cases payoff dominant
Nash equilibrium does not exist. From [15], define,
R1 = min
{
a11 − a21
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22
,
b11 − b12
b11 − b12 − b21 + b22
}
,
R2 = min
{
a22 − a12
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22
,
b22 − b21
b11 − b12 − b21 + b22
}
.
If R1 > R2, then (s1, s1) is risk dominant Nash equilibrium and if R2 > R1, then (s2, s2) is risk dominant
Nash equilibrium. A payoff dominant Nash equilibrium is always an SNE. Hence, CBR dynamics always
selects payoff dominant Nash equilibrium whenever it exists. When payoff dominant Nash equilibrium
does not exist then both the Nash equilibria are strong Nash equilibria and in that case CBR dynamics
selects both the Nash equilibria. While the stochastic dynamics by Young [15] always selects a risk
dominant Nash equilibrium.
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A 2 × 2 symmetric coordination game is considered by Kandori et al. [13]. For this game ajk = bkj ,
j, k ∈ {1, 2}. In this case there always exists a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium. Hence CBR dynamics
always selects payoff dominant Nash equilibrium which is the only SNE. While the stochastic dynamics
by Kandori et al. [13] always selects a risk dominant Nash equilibrium. Among symmetric coordination
games if we go beyond 2 × 2 matrix games the result by Young [15] cannot be generalized, i.e., it need
not select a risk dominant Nash equilibrium. Consider an example of 3× 3 matrix game from [15],
s1 s2 s3
s1
s2
s3


(6, 6) (0, 5) (0, 0)
(5, 0) (7, 7) (5, 5)
(0, 0) (5, 5) (8, 8)

.
Here (s1, s1), (s2, s2) and (s3, s3) are three Nash equilibria. The stochastic dynamics by Young [15]
selects (s2, s2) that is not a risk dominant Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium of an m×m symmetric
coordination game is risk dominant if it is risk dominant in all pairwise contest [8]. For above 3×3 game,
the Nash equilibrium (s3, s3) is a risk dominant as well as a payoff dominant and also an SNE. Hence,
CBR dynamics selects (s3, s3). In fact for all m×m symmetric coordination game, CBR dynamics always
selects a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium because it is an SNE.
4 Application to network formation games
In this section we consider the network formation games, see e.g., some recent books [10], [5], [4]. In
general, the networks which are stable against the deviation of all the coalitions are called as strongly
stable networks. In the literature, there are two definitions of strongly stable networks. The first definition
is due to Dutta and Mutuswami [6] that is corresponding to SNE. The second definition is due to Jackson
and van den Nouweland [11] that is corresponding SSNE. A strongly stable network according to the
definition of [11] is also strongly stable network according to the definition of [6]. The definition of a
strongly stable network according to Jackson and van den Nouweland [11] are more often considered
in the literature. We also consider the strong stability of networks according to Jackson and van den
Nouweland [11]. We discuss the dynamic formation of networks over infinite horizon. We apply the
CBR dynamics corresponding to SSNE to network formation games to discuss the stochastic stability of
networks.
4.1 The model
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a finite set of players also called as nodes. The players are connected through
undirected edges. An edge can be defined as a subset of N of size 2, e.g., {ij} ⊂ N defines an edge
between player i and player j. The collection of edges define a network. Let G denotes a set of all
networks on N . For each i ∈ N , let ui : G → R be a payoff function of player i, where ui(g) is a payoff
of player i at network g.
To reach from one network to another requires the addition of new links or the destruction of existing
links. It is always assumed in the literature that forming a new link requires the consent of both the
players while a player can delete a link unilaterally. The coalition formation in network formation games
has also been considered in the literature. Some players in a network can form a coalition and make a
joint move to another network by adding or severing some links, if new network is at least as beneficial
as the previous network for all the players of coalition and at least one player is strictly benefited (see
[11], [9]). We recall few definitions from [11] describing the coalitional moves in network formation games
and the stability of networks against all possible coalitional deviations.
Definition 4.1. A network g′ is obtainable from g via deviation by a coalition S ∈ S as denoted by
g →S g
′, if
1. ij ∈ g′ and ij /∈ g then {i, j} ⊂ S.
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2. ij ∈ g and ij /∈ g′ then {i, j} ∩ S 6= φ.
The first condition of the above definition requires that a new link can be added only between the nodes
which are the part of a coalition S and the second condition requires that at least one node of any deleted
link has to be a part of a coalition S. We denote G(S, g) as a set of all networks which are obtainable
from g via deviation by S, i.e., G(s, g) = {g′|g →S g′}.
Definition 4.2. A deviation by a coalition S from a network g to a network g′ is said to be improving if
1. g →S g
′,
2. ui(g
′) ≥ ui(g), ∀ i ∈ S (with at least one strict inequality).
We denote I2(S, g) as a set of all networks g′ which are obtainable from g by an improving deviation
of S, i.e.,
I2(S, g) =
{
g′|g →S g
′, ui(g
′) ≥ ui(g), ∀ i ∈ S, uj(g
′) > uj(g) for some j ∈ S
}
.
It is clear that g /∈ I2(S, g) for all S. We denote I2(S, g) = G(S, g) \ I2(S, g) as a set of all networks
which are obtainable from g due to erroneous decisions of S. This set is always nonempty as g ∈ I2(S, g)
for all S.
Definition 4.3. A network g is said to be strongly stable if it is not possible for any coalition S to make
an improving deviation from network g to some other network g′.
A strongly stable network need not always exist and in that case there exists some set of networks lying
on a closed cycle and all the networks in a closed cycle can be reached from each other via an improving
path. An improving path and a closed cycle in network formation games can be defined similarly to
Definitions 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
Theorem 4.4. There exists at least a strongly stable network or a closed cycle of networks.
Proof. The proof follows from the similar arguments used in Theorem 2.4.
4.2 Dynamic network formation
The paper by Jackson and Watts [12] is the first one to consider the dynamic formation of networks. They
considered the case where at each time only a pair of players form a coalition and only a link between
them can be altered. We consider the situation where at each time a subset of players form a coalition
and deviate from a current network to a new network if at new network the payoff of each player of the
coalition is at least as much as at current network and at least one player has strictly better payoff. This
process continues over infinite horizon. A coalition can make all possible changes in the network and as a
result more than one link can be created or severed at each time. So, we consider the following network
formation rules by Jackson and van den Nouweland [11] given below:
• Link addition is bilateral, i.e., forming a link between player i and player j requires the consent of
both players.
• Link destruction is unilateral, i.e., severing a link between player i and player j requires that player
i or player j or both agree to sever the link.
• At a time more than one link can be created or severed by the players.
The CBR dynamics corresponding to SSNE can be applied to dynamic network formation. That is, at
time t a network is gt and a coalition St is selected with probability pSt > 0 and it makes an improving
deviation to a new network that is at least as beneficial as gt for all players of coalition St and at least
one player of St is strictly benefited. So, at time t + 1 network is gt+1 ∈ I2(St, gt) with probability
pI2(gt+1|St, gt). If an improving deviation is not possible for selected coalition St, then gt+1 = gt. The
above process defines a Markov chain over state space G and its transition probabilities can be defined
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similarly to (3). In general this Markov chain is multichain whose absorbing set is either a strongly stable
network or a recurrent class having more than one network is a closed cycle of networks. We can also
assume that at each time selected coalition St makes error with small probability f(St, gt)ε. That is,
gt+1 ∈ I2(St, gt) with probability (1− f(St, gt)ε)pI2(gt+1|St, gt) and gt+1 ∈ I2(St, gt) with probability
f(St, gt)εpI2(gt+1|St, gt). The transition probabilities of the perturbed Markov chain can be defined
similarly to (4). The presence of mutations makes the Markov chain ergodic for which there exists a
unique stationary distribution. We are interested in the stochastically stable networks, i.e., the networks
to which positive probabilities are assigned by the stationary distribution as ε → 0. The stochastic
stability analysis similar to the one given in Section 3.2 holds here. Thus, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.5. All the strongly stable networks and closed cycles of a network formation game with the
corresponding CBR dynamics are stochastically stable.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 3.4.
5 Conclusions
We introduce coalition formation among players in an n-player strategic game over infinite horizon and
propose a CBR dynamics. The mutations are present in the dynamics due to erroneous decisions taken by
the coalitions. We prove that all strong Nash equilibria and closed cycles of action profiles are stochasti-
cally stable, i.e., they are selected by the CBR dynamics as mutations vanish. Similar development holds
for strict strong Nash equilibria. We applied CBR dynamics to network formation games and prove that
all strongly stable networks and closed cycles of networks are stochastically stable.
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A Algorithm for computing strong Nash equilibrium
We give a finite step algorithm that computes an SNE whenever it exists. If an SNE does not exist then
in finite number of steps the algorithm confirms that there is no SNE. From the definition of SNE an
action profile a is an SNE if there is no improved action profile a′ 6= a for any coalition S ∈ S, i.e.,
I1(S, a) = φ for all S ∈ S.
Algorithm 1
1: Choose a ∈ A.
2: Choose S ∈ S.
3: Choose a′S ∈ AS .
4: if ui(a
′
S , a−S) > ui(a), ∀ i ∈ S then
5: A = A \ {a}.
6: if |A| = 0 then
7: Go to Step 20
8: else
9: Go to Step 1.
10: else
11: AS = AS \ {a
′
S}
12: if |AS | = 0 then
13: S = S \ S.
14: if |S| = 0 then
15: Go to Step 21.
16: else
17: Go to Step 2
18: else
19: Go to Step 3
20: Strong Nash equilibrium does not exist
21: a is Strong Nash equilibrium
The Algorithm 1 terminates in finite number of steps because A and S are finite. If we replace Step
4 of the Algorithm 1 by ui(a′S , a−S) ≥ ui(a), ∀ i ∈ S together with at least one strict inequality, then
Algorithm 1 computes an SSNE whenever it exists.
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